Nuclear waste storage and environmental intergenerational externalities by Fodha, Mouez
Nuclear waste storage and environmental
intergenerational externalities
Mouez Fodha
To cite this version:
Mouez Fodha. Nuclear waste storage and environmental intergenerational externali-
ties. International Journal of Sustainable Development, Inderscience, 2015, 18, pp.94.
<10.1504/IJSD.2015.066792>. <insu-01105358>
HAL Id: insu-01105358
https://hal-insu.archives-ouvertes.fr/insu-01105358
Submitted on 20 Jan 2015
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
Nuclear Waste Storage and Environmental Intergenerational
Externalities
Mouez Fodha∗
January 2014
Abstract
This article analyzes the long-term consequences of nuclear waste storage within a general
equilibrium framework. The objective is to determine the conditions for which the storage
of waste, and thus the transfer of externalities towards the future, can be optimal. These
conditions could explain the implementation of intergenerational externalities, justifying an
intertemporal Not In My Back Yard behaviour. We ﬁrst show that the choice of the policy
instruments determines the feasibility of the storage policy. Indeed, economic stability imposes
precise levels of the rate of storage or of the tax rate, making it possible to avoid chaotic
economic dynamics. Under these speciﬁc conditions, and depending on the period at which an
accident may occur and on the value of the social discount rate, we show that storing all the
nuclear waste may be optimal.
Keywords: Overlapping Generations Model, Nuclear Waste, Environmental Externalities.
JEL Classiﬁcations: O13, Q53, Q58.
1 Introduction
World demand of energy is massively increasing and according to the Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change, we can expect an increase in the demand of energy of more than 100%
within ﬁfty years. The depletion of the fossil fuel resources and the world ﬂuctuations of the fuel
prices led many countries to have recourse to the nuclear energy. Nuclear power can therefore
be almost a part of the solution: it reduces the use of fossil energies (coal, oil, gas...); it reduces
the Green House Gas emissions; it decreases the risk linked to energy dependence; and ﬁnally it
protects against volatility of the international prices of resources. The European Union countries
in general, France in particular, have chosen nuclear power for the production of long-term energy,
thus making it possible to reach energy independence. Nuclear power energy is supposed to raise
economic competitiveness and is part of the ﬁght against climate change. Thus, 75% of the
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production of electricity in France is nuclear (of which a part is exported), and several countries
have launched vast programs of nuclear energy production. Choosing nuclear power is a very long
term engagement since we bequeath to future generations a heritage made up of parcels of waste,
radioactive for thousands years.
Chakravorty et alii. (2012) show that, under some conditions on the technological process
(like major developments in nuclear technology such as fast breeder reactors), the next generation
nuclear power may supply signiﬁcant amounts of clean energy. But, as these authors stated
“Without these new nuclear technologies, the problem of waste accumulation becomes critical.
Nuclear power may help us reduce atmospheric carbon, but will give rise to a new problem
of storing signiﬁcant amounts of toxic waste”. The issue addressed in this paper concerns the
management of the increasing nuclear waste stock. Indeed, the problem of the management of
the nuclear waste has still not been solved. In France, for example, there is still no deﬁnitive
technical solution for the future of this growing1 but non-desired production of waste. Basically,
three techniques of treatment are operative:
- Storage of long duration (SLD) in industrial deposits or in old nuclear thermal power plants,
or a few meters of depth under the natural level in an argillaceous formation of very low permeab-
ility, or more in-depth (old mine shaft);
- Storage (S) reversible or irreversible in deep geological repositories (argillaceous underground
tanks). This storage is suitable for waste with high activity and long life, as their radioactivity
present a strong thermal release problem. The deep geological repositories represent an environ-
ment which is a priori chemically, thermally and mechanically stable for geological scales of time
(but without any certainty on the safety given the temporal scale). In addition, this storage makes
it possible to be free from the high levels of permanent monitoring and maintenance which SLD
requires.
- Separation then transmutation (ST) of the radioactive elements (decreasing the harmfulness
and the lifespan of the radioactivity of waste). This technique admits a negative output since it
requires more energy than that obtained by the ﬁssion which generated this waste.
Governments have to choose between two temporary solutions, (SLD and S); they hence face
a trade-oﬀ between two risks: (i) risk of degradation of the protections of the parcels of waste
(SLD) and (ii) risk of non-decrease of the radioactivity (S). But these two waiting strategies,
(SLD) vs. (S), are not similar. In the ﬁrst case (SLD), the present generations have to bear the
harmful eﬀects of these centres of nuclear waste storage. In the second case (S), waste disappear
underground for several thousand years and reappear (i) voluntarily to be reprocessed like non
radioactive waste, (ii) or involuntarily as a result of an accident; in both cases, future generations
will have to bear these harmful eﬀects. Making the choice of storage in deep geological repositories
1 In the case of France, average annual production of radioactive waste increased by 20% in 20 years, passing from
1 to 1.2 kg per year per inhabitant (See CEA [2002]). It will in addition be necessary to manage the programme of
dismantling ﬁrst generation of nuclear power plants (28 nuclear plants out of the 56 existing).
2
corresponds to behave according to the NIMBY2 principle but within an intertemporal framework.
Several studies evaluate the willingness to pay (and/or to accept) for avoiding the proximity of
the nuclear waste (see Riddel and Schwer (2006)): this willingness to pay is always positive,
without any ambiguity, testifying the will to see waste moving away. Kunreuther and Easterling
(1990) show in addition that when a public project, like that of nuclear waste processing, admits
simultaneously positive and negative public components, monetary compensation is not enough to
make people accept the proximity of the dangerous site. Acceptability requires the conﬁdence of
the agents concerned in the agencies of control and the belief in minimal risks. Given the temporal
scale in which the management of the radioactivity ﬁts, this approach cannot be exploited since
the generations concerned by the harmful eﬀects of the storage have not yet been born.
The objective of this paper is to determine the conditions for which the storage of waste,
and thus the transfer of the externalities towards the future, can be optimal from a neoclassical
economics point of view. The existence of these conditions would justify the implementation
of intergenerational externalities, called here intertemporal NIMBY. The static resolution of the
spatial dimension of the conﬂicts induced by NIMBY behavior was carried out by Feinerman et
alii (2004). The authors show that the choice of localization between two cities of a public bad
by a government will be a function of the costs and social beneﬁts of each site, but also of the
weight of the lobbies on the decision makers and of the degree of corruption of the government.
Concerning the long-term nuclear waste management, future generations can claim no lobby. Our
approach is intertemporal and considers the removal of nuclear waste in the future.
Actually, the seminal papers of Allais (1947), Samuelson (1958) and Diamond (1965) on in-
tergenerational transfers show that current and future generations have limited opportunities for
trade or coordination of policies. In the context of sustainable development, these limitations may
have dramatic consequences since they lower the incentive to protect the environmental quality
whose primary beneﬁt falls on future generations. In particular, if we consider egoistic agents
who neglect the eﬀect of their actions on later generations and only demand goods for their own
beneﬁt. If current generations do not internalize the eﬀects of their actions on future generations,
there is an intergenerational externality that distorts the demand for environmental quality.
There is a huge literature examining the relationship between economic growth, environmental
quality and intergenerational equity. This paper relates to two strands of the literature: the
literature examining sustainable growth in a risky world characterized by uncertainties on the
long-term environmental consequences of our current economic behavior, and the literature looking
at intergenerational externalities in environmental quality. This paper examines these two issues
jointly.
The ﬁrst branch of the literature analyzes the environmental consequences (like climate change,
2NIMBY (Not In My Back Yard) indicates the actions of associations for the defence of an environment which
are opposed to an infrastructure degrading the quality of life of a district, without denying its intrinsic social utility,
but disputing its establishment because of the harmful local eﬀects which it creates. The construction of factories,
motorways, prisons, centres of rehabilitation and detoxication or concert halls cause such opposition regularly.
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biodiversity losses, health) of economic growth and technological accidents in optimal growth
models; the latter consider an inﬁnitely-lived agent or an intertemporal social planner (Tsur and
Zemel (1996), (1998), (2008)).
The second branch of the literature analyzes how intergenerational externalities aﬀect environ-
mental outcomes but without considering any risk or uncertainties. John and Pecchenino (1994),
John et alii (1995) and Marini and Scaramozzinno (1995) explore how distortions in abatement
decisions aﬀect environmental quality, von Amsberg (1995) and Howarth (1991a) (1991b) show
how the incompleteness of insurance markets can lead to poor environmental outcomes. In the
context of natural resources, Solow (1974), (1986), Howarth and Norgaard (1990), (1992), and
more recently Gerlagh and Keyzer (2001) (2003), Agnani et alii (2005) or Valente (2011) explore
how the eﬃcient resource extraction path is aﬀected by the distribution of rights and assets across
generations. The focus of this article is on how intergenerational externalities aﬀect the govern-
ment’s decisions about nuclear waste processing; this focus distinguishes my paper from related
work.
The objective of this paper is on understanding the eﬀect of intergenerational externalities
on long-term energy policies (namely, nuclear strategy), and, hence, we abstract from intragen-
erational externalities. We consider a myopic government and myopic agents that internalize the
intragenerational externality but do not internalize the intergenerational distortions.
There are several possibilities for selﬁsh individuals to raise their chances to achieve intergen-
erational equity. First, one could consider altruistic agents who care about their children. When
individuals care about the utility of their children, they may demand more long-term environ-
mental quality. Second, governments could introduce policies to internalize intergenerational
externalities. Finally, intergenerational coordination mechanisms could link diﬀerent generations
to achieve intergenerational equity. Nevertheless, the optimality issue of these possibilities depend
upon the choices of the value of the discount rate.
Obviously, the debate about discounting is of big importance for environmental concerns; it
aﬀects the intergenerational justice and the deﬁnition of sustainability. This debate on discounting
is still open among economists. In general discounting reﬂects the price of time. This rate
is important for consumers because it determines the intertemporal trade-oﬀ between present
and future consumption; it is also important for producers, as it inﬂuences the intertemporal
trade-oﬀ between investing or not. Basically, the concept of discounting is easily comprehended in
ﬁnancial terms, in an individual context. At a macroeconomic level, there may be confusion about
discounting. Probably this confusion relies on the distinction between an individual psychological
discount factor, or rate of time preference, representing individual impatience and a social discount
rate, reﬂecting short-term acceptability of the social costs.
Regarding environmental long term issues, discounting welfare of the future generations seems
unfair; and minimizing the long-term environmental costs of our present economic actions is
probably unfair too. These issues about discounting and intergenerational equity has been pointed
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out in two seminal papers. Howarth and Norgaard (1993) ﬁrst show the important role played
by the discount rate in cost-beneﬁt analysis. They show that cost-beneﬁt techniques will result
in a Pareto eﬃcient resource allocation only if the discount rate is set equal to the market rate
of interest. They conclude that ethical principles should deﬁne the proper distribution of welfare
between present and future generations. Krautkramer and Batina (1999) examine sustainability in
overlapping generations models with resource constraints. They also show that economic eﬃciency
depends on the value of the social rate of time preference.
This debate gives birth to a huge controversy after the publication of the Stern report (2006).
Most criticisms targeted the choice of low values for the discount rate.3 As Godard (2009) pointed
out “The results of a critical examination of this debate on discounting are that, for essential
matters, the Stern Review is more right than wrong, in the context of the utilitarian philosophy
that provides the conceptual basis of cost-beneﬁt analysis used as well by Stern and his critics”.
It appears that the debates on the right climate policies to pursue enlighten a rather diﬃcult and
confused relationship between economics and ethics. Godard (2009) concludes that “For the future
works, several avenues of progress have been identiﬁed, both within and outside utilitarianism, in
order to ﬁnd a more appropriate way to address huge long-term environmental threats like global
climate change.”
Hence, for ethical reasons and for intergenerational justice too, environmental economists have
progressively abandoned the “pure neoclassical” discounting approach. Many reasons justify a non
(exogenous) discounting approach, like irreversibility and uncertainty.4 Environmental economists
have developed alternative criterions. Some recent papers propose neoclassical approaches with
low or even non discounting criteria.5 Chichilnisky (1996) principle consists in a non-dictatorship
of the present and non-dictatorship of the future. The objective function is a sum of two sub
functions that take into account a discounted welfare and a very long-term non-discounted welfare.6
Li and Löfgren (2000) consider an objective function that takes into account the heterogeneity
of agents (utilitarist and conservationist agents). The objective function is a sum of the two
welfare functions: one is discounted, not the other. In Ayong Le Kama and Schubert (2004), the
discount rate is endogenous and depends on the environmental quality at each period of time.
Hence, impatience is low when pollution is high. A last approach adopts a social welfare function
that takes into account uncertainty on economic variables, like consumption (Gollier (2002a)) or
interest rate (Weitzman (1998)).
Basically, philosophers and mathematicians have proposed solutions to the discounting de-
bates, mainly addressed to the issue of climate change (Gardiner (2004), (2006)), Portney and
3 see for instance Nordhaus (2007) and Weitzman (2007).
4Gollier (2002a) (2002b) show that depending on the nature of risk preferences, one may optimally decrease the
social discount rate.
5For survey, see for instance Groom et alii (2005), Pearce et alii. (2003), Portney and Weyant (1999) or Schubert
(2006).
6See Chichilnisky and Heal (1998) for some applications of the Chichilnisky’s principle.
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Weyant (1999), Caney (2008), Davidson (2012)), and some of them are speciﬁcally designed to
treat the issue of nuclear waste (Shrader-Frechette (1994a), (1994b) and Taebi (2012)).
Regarding climate change, Gardiner (2004) (2006) draw attention to the ethical dimensions
of the climate change problem, and claims that climate change is fundamentally an ethical issue.
As such, it should be of serious concern to moral philosophers. Portney and Weyant (1999)
shed light on the importance of the legacy that we may be leaving for future generations. They
conclude that there will always be diﬀering views on the appropriateness of discounting, not to
mention the rate to use. Caney (2008) argues that we should see climate change as a threat
to human rights and proposes an alternative to the cost-beneﬁt analysis. Discounting is not
recommended: Caney concludes indeed that the rights jeopardised by dangerous climate change
do not diminish in importance throughout time. Finally, Shrader-Frechette (1994a) (1994b) and
Taebi (2012) shed light on the fairness of present generations to impose the burden of nuclear
waste on future generations. They both show that such decision is disputable as it relies on high
long-term uncertainties. Indeed, putting distant future generations at a disadvantage does lack
solid moral justiﬁcation. This should urge us to reconsider our temporal moral obligations in the
light of recent technological developments.
In this paper, we analyze the long-term consequences of burying nuclear waste within an
overlapping generations models framework. This framework allows theoretical analysis of sustain-
ability and led several works relating to the intergenerational environmental externalities. These
studies show that the taking into account of myopic short-lived generations, increases the amp-
litude of the intertemporal externalities, and makes the task of the social planner more complex,
requiring additional economic instruments.
Our results are in line with the previous ones: we show that the storage of the radioactive
waste requires an institutional control of the production of this waste. Nevertheless, our objective
is diﬀerent from the ones of the previous studies, since we are interested neither in intertemporal
allocation of natural resources, nor in the trade-oﬀ between growth and environmental quality.
Our trade-oﬀ is that of the management of ﬂows of pollution between present and future.
The model is presented in the second section of this paper. It relies on standard assumptions
of the overlapping generations framework. The economy consists of two-periods lived agents. The
government ﬁnances its spending for waste storage with help of a labour tax and a pollution
tax. In the third section, we analyze the dynamic equilibrium and we show that in order to
reach economic stability, the government has to control the waste storage activity. Hence, public
policy for waste storage is needed in order to avoid chaotic development. In the fourth section,
we characterize the long-term optimum: we show that the optimal level of capital is still lower
than the ones deﬁned by the (modiﬁed) golden rule. In section 5, we analyze the public policies
that decentralize the optimal equilibrium. We show that depending on some parameter values
(like the private and the social discount rates, or the cost of waste storage), conditions can be
found to allow the government to store the whole nuclear waste at each period. Therefore, the
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intertemporal NIMBY behavior can be optimal, if optimality is deﬁned in a Pareto-Walrasian
way.
2 The model
We consider a perfectly competitive overlapping generations model with discrete time t = 1, 2, ...,∞,
and a constant population normalized to one. A generation of consumers is born at each period and
households live two periods. When young, the representative consumer supplies labor, supposed
to be inelastic and normalized to unity, and receives the net wage (1− τwt )wt where τ
w
t ∈ [0, 1] is
the tax rate on the wage wt. He shares his wage between saving st and consumption c
y
t . Let T
y
t
deﬁnes public transfer and τkt ∈ [0, 1] the tax rate on saving. When old, he consumes c
o
t+1 which
represents the totality of his saving remunerated at the interest rate rt+1. The agent cares about
the quality of the environment measured by the index Qt. The quality of the environment is an
externality for the agent.7
We assume that the utility function consists of two increasing functions u and z, strictly
concave, homothetic and satisfy the Inada conditions. The utility function of the representative
household at period t is given by:
U

cyt , Qt, c
o
t+1,Qt+1

= u

cyt , c
o
t+1

+ θz (Qt, Qt+1) (1)
where θ ∈ [0, 1] gives the weight of the quality of the environment on the utility. The two budget
constraints faced by the household can be written: (1− τ
w
t )wt − T
y
t = c
y
t + st
cot+1 = (1 + rt+1)

1− τkt+1

st
(2)
The representative consumer maximizes his utility function (1) under the constraints (2) and
(3), which yields the necessary ﬁrst order conditions determining the trade-oﬀ between present
and future consumptions:
u′cy − (1 + rt+1)

1− τkt+1

u′co = 0 (3)
The ﬁnal good is produced by a representative ﬁrm using constant returns to scale technology.
The production is given by:
y = f(kt) with f ′ (.) > 0; f ′′ (.) ≤ 0 , (4)
f(kt) = k
µ
t , with µ ∈ ]0, 1[
and where y and k are respectively the output per worker and the capital-labor ratio. The
production function f (.) satisﬁes the Inada conditions.
7This assumption is the main cause of intergenerational externalities; it implies that the households cannot adjust
their behavior to the evolution of the perceived environmental quality. Assuming individual protection against
pollution would enhance the results but it would also require numerical methods to solve the general equilibrium.
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The representative ﬁrm maximizes its proﬁt:
Max
kt
πt = f(kt)−wt − (1 + rt)kt
Since the economy is perfectly competitive, the proﬁt maximization results to: f
′(kt) = 1 + rt
f(kt)− ktf
′(kt) = wt
(5)
The storage of nuclear waste
We assume that a technology of storing waste is available in the economy represented by a
function of projection P i such as:
∀xt, P
i (xt) = x
t
t+i (6)
When the economy generates a ﬂow of pollution xt at period t, the government can decide
to store it until period t + i. The unit cost of the storage is measured by σ, which consists
of development of the speciﬁc parcels of waste, cost of setting in basement, protective concrete
cover. At the time of the destocking8 of waste in t + i, the incremental9 rate of harmfulness
is unknown. This uncertain rate is γ˜ = (γ, γ), where γ ∈ [0, 1[ and P

γ˜ = γ

= 1 − q with
q ∈ [0, 1]; also, γ ∈ [1,+∞[ and P (γ˜ = γ) = q. The expected value of the rate of harmfulness is
thus E (γ˜) = (1− q) γ + qγ. This probability q of high harmfulness could also be interpreted as
the probability that one of the site of storage10 at period t has an accident at period t+ i.
A simple application will correspond to the case with γ = 0 (total disappearance of harmful-
ness), then we have E (γ˜) = qγ. If moreover qγ = 1, stored waste will be destocked in t+ i without
additional harmfulness, they are simply projected in the future.
The total stock of waste stored must be ﬁnite in volume; it writes:
St =
i=T
i=1
xt−i <∞ (7)
8The destocking of waste can be voluntary (the physical limit of the capacities of storage is reached or the
radioactivity is considered to be suﬃciently low) or involuntary (natural wear at the end of periods t + i), even
accidental.
9The rate of degradation of the environment by the production of waste is given for the economy. This constant
rate will be aﬀected in the future by the incremental rate: the rate of degradation of the environment in the future
of waste produced in the present is thus unknown.
10At the period t + i, among 100 sites of storage of the generation t, 100q are confronted to important damages
(accidents, leakages, explosions...). I actually assume a constant probability of accident. This is a limitation.
Nevertheless, this probability of accident could be explained by two factors that play in opposite directions. The
natural wear may deteriorate the storage repositories in the long-term but the technical progress may help the
storage to get safer in the future. I assume that the technical progress compensates for the natural wear.
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The evolution of the quality of the environment
The production of nuclear power generates a ﬂow of waste FPt which degrades the index of
environmental quality. More precisely, this loss of amenities is explained by the two following types
of processing waste: (i) Storage of long duration (SLD) in industrial repositories, which degrades
the landscape and involves in particular losses in real value. (ii) Separation then transmutation
(ST), which creates new waste not (or less) radioactive but which requires a great quantity of
energy, which generates new radioactive waste.
The storage in deep geological repository of a share α of the waste during i periods makes it
possible to decrease his harmful eﬀects for the present generations11, since on the one hand, the
storage is carried out under several hundred meters under ground what makes the parcels of waste
invisible, and on the other, after i periods, the process of treatment will be probably simpler and
less expensive in energy, because of the decrease of the radioactivity. Nevertheless, these strategies
do nothing than to project in the future the contemporary externalities since the basement has
limits of storage. Moreover, taking into account the present state of technological knowledge, on
a long temporal scale (beyond 1000 years), it is not excluded that the erosion of the walls of the
parcels of waste by the water yields the diﬀusion of the active radionuclide via the ground water.
We assume that, at each date, the economy rejects a ﬂow of solid waste proportional to the
capital:
FPt = φkt (8)
where φ > 0 is the rate of degradation of the environment.
The dynamic of the quality of the environment is given by:
Qt+i+1 = Q˜+ [1− h]Qt+i − (1− α)FPt+i −E (γ˜)P
i (αFPt) (9)
where h ∈ [0, 1] represents autonomous rate of variation of the quality of the environment12,
α ∈ [0, 1] is the share of the current ﬂow of pollution that the government decides to store in
deep geological repository in t for i periods, while waiting for the decrease of the radioactivity.
We suppose that, at the period t, the oldest stocks are destocked in chronological order. The
destocking can be voluntary (in the case of reversible storage) if the government estimates that
the radioactivity of the parcels of t − i is suﬃciently low while he has to store the waste of t
(more radioactive) and being given limit of the total volume of storage capacities (the government
manages substitutions in the geological tank of non-radioactive waste by radioactive waste). The
destocking can also be accidental (in the case of irreversible storage) reﬂecting the existence of
a rate of depreciation of protections coming from natural erosion (corrosion of the protections
by water and compressing of the concrete structures). The oldest parcels are most vulnerable
11We do not consider the risk in t bearing on the totality of the stocks hidden between t− i and t: risk coming
from natural disasters, explosions, climatic change, air crashes... This risk is higher since the storage period i is at
a scale of several thousands years.
12The term h can be interpreted as the capacity of assimilation of the environment.
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representing a natural process which answers chemical laws. In these two cases, the government
cannot intervene any more on pollution since this one became diﬀuse.
Taking into account the sources of pollution the dynamic of the quality of the environment
can be written:
Qt+i+1 = Q˜+ [1− h]Qt+i − (1− α)φkt+i −

(1− q) γ + qγ

αφkt (10)
The government uses the taxes on labor and capital to ﬁnance the cost of storing waste and
lump-sump transfers, T yt , allow balancing the budget:
σαφkt = τ
k
t (1 + rt) st−1 + τ
w
t wt + T
y
t (11)
The goods market equilibrium is given by:
yt = c
y
t + c
o
t + kt+1 + σαFPt (12)
This market equilibrium takes into account the economic cost of storing the waste.
The labor market equilibrium is given by Lt = Nt.
The Walras law allows deducing the capital market equilibrium:
kt+1 = st

(1− τwt )w (kt)−

1− τkt+1

(1 + r (kt+1))

(13)
A competitive equilibrium for this economy is a sequence
	
yt, kt, c
y
t , c
o
t , st, wt, rt, T
y
t , τ
w
t , τ
k
t

∞
t=1
,
such that, at each date t = 1, 2, ...,
(i) agents maximize (1) subject to (2);
(ii) ﬁrms maximize proﬁts;
(iii) markets clear;
(iv) the quality of the environment evolves according to the law (9);
and {k0,Q0} are given.
3 Dynamic equilibrium analysis
Let deﬁne ηc a parameter of preference elasticity: ηc =
co
cy
u′co
u′
cy
∈ ]0,∞[ , which is supposed to be
constant. This assumption limits the utility functional forms to some forms like the logarithmic
10
and the Cobb-Douglas cases. The equation (3) becomes after substitution of the equation of the
capital market equilibrium (13):
cyt =
1
ηc (1 + rt+1)

1− τkt+1
cot+1 (14)
Taking into account (2) , we have:
cyt =
1
ηc
kt+1 (15)
From the budget constraints and the prices relations we ﬁnd:
cyt = (1− τ
w
t ) (1− µ) k
µ
t − kt+1 − T
y
t (16)
Equalizing (15) and (16) , we obtain:
kt+1 =
ηc
1 + ηc
[(1− τwt ) (1− µ)k
µ
t − T
y
t ] (17)
From the budget equilibrium of the government (11) , with the equilibrium conditions and the
price relations, we can write:
T yt = σαφkt − µτ
k
t k
µ
t − (1− µ) τ
w
t k
µ
t (18)
Substituting equation (18) into (17), we obtain the dynamic of the capital stock:
kt+1 =
ηc
1 + ηc

1− µ

1− τkt

kµt − σαφkt

(19)
Thus, we have a ﬁrst-order nonlinear diﬀerence equation, which with equation (10) , determine
the dynamic of the economy. The dynamic of the stock of capital being autonomous, we can
analyze independently their properties. Since the stock of capital enters linearly into the dynamic
of the quality of the environment, the dynamic properties of the quality of the environment can
then be deduced.
The dynamic of the stock of capital can be rewritten:
kt+1 = a1k
µ
t − akt ≡ G

kt; τ
k
t , σ, α, φ

(20)
where a1 =
ηc
1+ηc

1− µ

1− τkt

> 0 and a = ηc1+ηc
σαφ  0. The properties of this equation will
depend on the level of σφα measuring the marginal cost of storing waste, σφαkt being the total
cost. The equation (22) is nonlinear and it is straightforward to show that the G map satisﬁes
the following conditions:
[P.1] G (0) = G
k = 0, where k = a1a  11−µ is the upper bound of the stock of capital k;
[P.2] G is once continuously diﬀerentiable and there exists k =

µa1
a
 1
1−µ such that G is strictly
increasing on

0, k

and strictly decreasing on

k,k;
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[P.3] limk→0G
′ (0) = +∞;
[P.4] the unique positive steady state equilibrium is given by k∗ =

a1
1+a
 1
1−µ
;
[P.5] G′ (k∗) = µ− a (1− µ) < 1 since a > 0 and µ ∈ ]0, 1[;
[P.6] If a >=< µ
−
µ
1−µ
1−µ , G

k

>=< k; G maps 0, k into itself if a ≤ µ− µ1−µ1−µ .
The property [P.6] implies that there exists circumstances in which G does not map

0,k into
itself, thereby admitting more complicated dynamic structure. We can distinguish two diﬀerent
dynamic structures with respect to the value of a.
Case 1: a  µ
−
µ
1−µ
1−µ
In this case G maps

0,k into itself. That means, any iterates of the set of an initial capital
stock will remain in the interval. In that case, the dynamic system may exhibit a series of
bifurcation, including the appearances of cycles and the transition to aperiodic or chaotic behavior.
When a is not very high, there exists a unique steady state characterized by k∗ =

a1
1+a
 1
1−µ
.
Proposition 1 (i) If a ∈ (0, µ1−µ ], for all k0 ∈

0,k , limt→∞Gt (k0) = k∗. k∗ is a stable node.
(ii) If a ∈ ( µ1−µ ,
1+µ
1−µ ], then for all k0 ∈

0,k , limt→∞Gt (k0) = k∗. k∗ is a stable spiral.
The relevant parameter ranges for a are given by the two cases for which the slopes of G
evaluated at the ﬁx point k∗ belong to G′ (k∗) ∈ (0, µ) and G′ (k∗) ∈ (−1, 0). Indeed, we have:
G′ (k∗) = µ− a (1− µ) =


0 if a = µ1−µ
µ if a = 0
−1 if a = 1+µ1−µ
.
Since a = ηc1+ηc
σφα, the feasibility of the policy of storing waste is conditional to the dynamics
of capital stock. According to the level of the marginal cost of storing waste, the government
will choose a level of storage (then a tax rate to ﬁnance it) which will determine the dynamic of
the economy. The government can then avoid a chaotic dynamic13 and controls the trajectory of
pollution and nuclear waste, whatever are the initial conditions.
From Zhang (1999) and the literature on nonlinear dynamics (Devaney (2003)), we can es-
tablish the following propositions 2 and 3, which determine the conditions for the appearance of
n-period cycles, in particular the 2-period and 3-period cycles.
13When the dynamic of the stock of capital is chaotic, then the dynamic of the emissions of nuclear waste is also
chaotic since FPt = φkt.
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Proposition 2 (i) If a ∈

1+µ
1−µ ,
µ−µ/(1−µ)
1−µ

, map G generates a two-period cycle, and the set of
k0 ∈

0,k such as Gt (k0) converges to the steady state, k∗, is at most countable. (ii)
As a rises, the dynamic system (18) experiences period-doubling or ﬂip bifurcations. That
is, there exists a value of a, a∗ ∈

1+µ
1−µ ,
µ−µ/(1−µ)
1−µ

such that attracting cycles of period 2n,
for n ≥ 2, emerge; (iii) for higher value as further rises of a, there exists a value of a,
a∗∗ ∈

1+µ
1−µ ,
µ−µ/(1−µ)
1−µ

such that period 3 cycle of G emerges if a > a∗∗.
Proposition 2 is similar to proposition 3 of Zhang (1999) since map G has the same form than
the one in his paper. This proposition suggests that as a rises, the set of equilibriums evolves from
endogenous ﬂuctuations to chaotic equilibriums, passing through periodic equilibriums (see Fig.
1). The property of the dynamic and the characteristic of equilibriums evolve according to the
values of σ,α, φ: higher are the marginal cost σ and the burying rate α, more chaotic equilibriums
can appear.
Case 2: a > µ
−µ/(1−µ)
1−µ
When a is successively raised to some high values, the topological structure under this case
is much more complicated than under the previous case, and the results can be summarized by
proposition 314.
Proposition 3 If µµ [(1− µ) a− 1](1−µ) > (a− 1) /a, the set of an initial capital stock that never
escapes from

0,k is a Cantor set; that is, it is a closed, totally disconnected, and perfect
subset of

0,k . As a result, given any initial value, the subsequent transitional dynamics
for k become very complex.
14Proposition 3 is also similar to proposition 4 of Zhang (1999) for the same reason of similarity of map G.
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4 Long term optimum
Assume the existence of a social planner maximizing the utility of all generations discounted by
a social discount factor δ (0 < δ < 1). The social planner programme writes:
max
c
y
t ;c
o
t+1;Qt;kt
+∞
t=1
δt−1

u

cyt , c
o
t+1

+ θz (Qt,Qt+1)

under the constraints:
yt = c
y
t + c
o
t + kt+1 + σαφkt (∀t = 1, ...,+∞)
Qt+1 = Q˜+ [1− h]Qt − (1− α)φkt −

(1− q) γ + qγ

αφkt−i (∀t = 1, ...,+∞)
yt = f(kt) (∀t = 1, ...,+∞)
k0 and Q0 given.
To the resource constraint of period t is associated the multiplicator δtλ1,t; the planner takes
into account the cost of storing waste on the allocation of resource, which reduces consumption
and investment possibilities. To the quality of the environment dynamic Qt is associated the
multiplicator δtλ2,t. Then we can ﬁnd the following relation
15:
λ2 =
(1− h) θ z′ (1 + δ)
1− δ (1− h)
> 0 (21)
where λ2 is the shadow price of the quality of the environment. It allows to deﬁne the marginal
social beneﬁt of the variation of the quality of the environment and must equal the discounted
value of the marginal utility of the environment. Thus, (1− h) θ z′ represents the long-term
impact of the environment for the coexisting two generations, δ being the discounting term. One
can remark that the result is consistent with the relevant discount rate for environment policies
deﬁned by Marini and Scaramozzino (1995) , which is equal to the sum of the social discount rate
1
δ − 1 and the rate of natural assimilation h.
We can determine the capital shadow price λ1:
λ1 =
Θ θz
′(1+δ)
1−δ(1−h)
f ′ − σαφ− 1
δ
> 0 (22)
where Θ = φ

1− α

1− δiE (γ˜)

> 0 is the average discounted rate of long-term pollutant
emissions with E (γ˜) = (1− q)γ + qγ.
The marginal eﬀect of storing waste on the long-term well-being is measured by Θz′ θ1−δ(1−h) .
This marginal eﬀect, depending on the average discounted rate of pollution, can be either positive
or negative. Indeed, this average discounted rate is a function, Θ

φ
+
, α
?
, δ
+
, i
−
, qγ
+

. If the duration
of storage increases, the discounting eﬀect (corresponding to lower values of δ) decreases the
15The resolution is presented on appendix, page 20.
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pollution consequences on welfare, Θ′δ > 0. The eﬀect of storing waste depends on the sign of
1− δiE (γ˜) . If δiE (γ˜) > 1, the long-term storage degrades more the quality of the environment
than the amelioration it is supposed to do: Θ′α  0. In the opposite, if δ
iE (γ˜) < 1, the storage
allows to pollute less than it protects: Θ′α < 0. In the case where E (γ˜) = 1 and with a discount
factor δ = 1, storing the waste will have no eﬀect in the long term: Θ = φ.
The shadow price of the capital stock λ1 is positive if and only if f
′ > σαφ+ 1δ

= kˆvorm

. In
the economy with pollution, the planner will choose a level of intensive capital lower than the one
determined by the golden rule (Samuelson optimum), but also lower than the one of the modiﬁed
golden rule.
The intergenerational trade-oﬀ rule deﬁned by the social planner is given by:
u′cy =
1
δ
u′co (23)
This rule expresses the optimal condition for the trade-oﬀ between cy and co. We can determine
the expression of the optimal cˆy and cˆo using the conditions deﬁned by (21) , (22) , (23) . Using
these expressions with the equilibrium condition of the goods market gives the following relation:
f ′

kˆ

= θ
1 + δ
1− δ (1− h)
Θz′
u′cy
+ σαφ+
1
δ
(24)
The planner maximization programme solution’s can be summarized by the following system,
which determines

cˆy, cˆo, kˆ, Qˆ

:

u′cy =
1
δu
′
co
f ′

kˆ

=
Θ
θz′(δ+1)
1−δ(1−h)
u′
cy
+ σαφ+ 1δ
f

kˆ

= cˆo + cˆy + (1 + σαφ) kˆ
Qˆ = Q˜h −
φ
h

1− α

1−
	
(1− q) γ + qγ


kˆ
(25)
5 The decentralized equilibrium
The planner must propose the tax rates that allow the competitive equilibrium (system (29)) to
coincide with the long term equilibrium (system (25)). There are two economic ineﬃciencies: (i)
the dynamic ineﬃciency leading to over or under-accumulation of capital ; (ii) and the production
of pollutant nuclear waste. The optimal tax-transfer scheme is composed by two instruments
(τˆw, τˆk). The tax policy allows to reach the capital deﬁned by the Modiﬁed Golden Rule (τˆw) and
to internalize the ﬂow of pollutants (τˆk). A third instrument T y allows to balance the government
budget.
15
To reach the optimum, we must ﬁnd the intergenerational trade-oﬀ rule (23) from the trade-oﬀ
condition (3) evaluated at the steady state:
1
(1 + r∗)

1− τˆk
 = δ, (26)
which yields the following value for τˆk:
τˆk = 1−
1
(1 + r∗) δ
. (27)
In that case, since (1 + r∗) = f ′

kˆ

at the optimum, we obtain the following optimal value for
the tax rate:
τˆk = 1−
1
f ′

kˆ

δ
=
δ
Θ
θz′(1+δ)
1−δ(1−h)
u′cy
+ σαφδ
1 + δ
Θ θz
′(1+δ)
1−δ(1−h)
u′
cy
+ σαφδ
> 0. (28)
This tax allows to correct the environmental externality, its rate increases as the marginal envir-
onmental damage is high, Θz′, with respect to the marginal utility of the consumption u′cy .
The capital market equilibrium allows to determine the wage tax on the young τˆw. This
relation is such that:
kˆ = s

(1− τˆw)w

kˆ

− Tˆ y,

1− τˆkt+1

f ′

kˆ

.
This condition allows to ﬁx the tax rate that corrects the dynamic ineﬃciency and then to reach
the stock of capital deﬁned by the Modiﬁed Golden Rule. Finally, the budget equilibrium condition
determines the level of the lump-sump tax:
Tˆ y = τˆkµkˆµ + τˆw (1− µ) kˆµ − σαφkˆ.
For a given level of τˆk, condition (28) deﬁnes the share of waste αˆ to store which is unique,
and compatible with optimality. In that case, the government ﬁxes the optimal rate of storage
such that:
αˆ =
τk
1−τk
−B
δφσ −B

1− δiE (γ˜)

where B = δφ
θ z
′
u′
cy
(1+δ)
1−δ(1−h) > 0.
For certain values of δ and q, this optimal share can be equal to unity. Therefore we can be
in the particular case of total intergenerational NIMBY as αˆ = 1. The government decides to
postpone all the pollution into the future to reach the social optimum. It would be the case if:
τk
1− τk
= δφσ +BδiE (γ˜) .
But the economic conditions allowing to avoid a chaotic dynamic bear on the parameter
a = ηc1+ηc
σφα. Hence, it is necessary that a should not be too high, which settles some bounds
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on αˆ, corresponding to the feasibility of the economic policy. In fact, it is possible to reach stable
solutions if:
a 
1 + µ
1− µ
⇔ αˆ 
δφσ −B

1− δiE (γ˜)

τk
1−τk
−B
1 + ηc
ηc
1
σφ
1 + µ
1− µ
.
6 Conclusion
This paper analyzes the conditions for which the storage of waste, and thus the transfer of the
externalities towards the future, can be optimal. If they exist, these conditions would justify the
policy of projections in the future of present radioactive waste, in spite of uncertainty relating
to future harmfulness. This environmental policy exacerbates the intergenerational externalities.
These choices correspond thus to intertemporal NIMBY behaviors. We show that storing the
radioactive waste requires an institutional control of the production of this waste, in order to avoid
a not controlled evolution of it. Moreover, the choice of the regulatory instruments determines the
feasibility of the policy. Indeed, the research of economic stability determines thresholds of rate
of storage or rate of tax making it possible to avoid the chaotic evolutions. Lastly, the optimal
choice of the public instruments does not exclude the possibility of storing all the waste for the
government. This solution can be desirable according to, in particular, the duration envisaged of
the storing and the value of the social discount rate. Indeed, the more the temporal horizon of
destocking is remote and the more the perception of serious risk of future pollution decreases.
References
Agnani B., Gutierrez M.J., Iza A. (2005), “Growth in overlapping generation economies with non-
renewable resources,” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 50, p. 387-407.
Allais M., (1947), Économie et Intérêt, Imprimerie Nationale, Paris.
Ayong Le Kama A., Schubert K. (2004), “Growth, Environment and Uncertain Future Prefer-
ences,” Environmental and Resource Economics, 28(1), p. 31-53.
Caney S. (2008), “Human rights, climate change, and discounting,” Environmental Politics, 17(4),
Special Issue: Perspectives on Justice, Democracy and Global Climate Change.
CEA (2002), “Les recherches pour la gestion des déchets nucléaires, les résultats d’aujourd’hui,
les solutions de demain...”, CLEFS.
Chakravorty U., Magne B., Moreaux M. (2006), “Resource Use under Climate Stabilization: Can
Nuclear Power Provide Clean Energy?”, Journal of Public Economic Theory, 14(2), p. 349-389.
17
Chichilnisky G. (1996), “An axiomatic approach to sustainable development,” Social Choice and
Welfare, 13(2), 231-257.
Chichilnisky G., Heal G. (1998), “A uniﬁed treatment of ﬁnite and inﬁnite economies: limited
arbitrage is necessary and suﬃcient for the existence of equilibrium and the core,” Economic
Theory, 12(1), p. 163-176.
Davidson M.D. (2012), “Intergenerational Justice: How Reasonable Man Discounts Climate Dam-
age,” Sustainability, 4(1), p. 106-122.
Devaney R.L. (2003), An introduction to Chaotic Dynamical Systems, Boston University, Ed.
Diamond P.A. [1965], “National Debt in a Neoclassical Model,” American Economic Review, 55,
p. 1126-1250.
Feinerman, E., Finkelshtain I., Kan I. (2004), “On a Political Solution to the NIMBY Conﬂict”,
American Economic Review 94(1), pp. 369-381.
Gardiner S.M. (2004), “Ethics and Global Climate Change,” Ethics, 114(3), p. 555-600.
Gardiner S.M. (2006), “A Perfect Moral Storm: Climate Change, Intergenerational Ethics and
the Problem of Moral Corruption,” Environmental Values, 15, p. 397—413.
Gerlagh R., Keyzer M. (2001), “Sustainability and the intergenerational distribution of natural
resource entitlements,” Journal of Public Economics, 79(2), p. 315-341.
Gerlagh R., Keyzer M. (2003), “Eﬃciency of conservationist measures: an optimist viewpoint,”
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 46(2), p. 310-333.
Godard O. (2009), “Time discounting and long-run issues: the controversy raised by the Stern
Review of the economics of climate change,” OPEC Energy Review, 33(1), p. 1-22.
Gollier C. (2002a), “Discounting an uncertain future,” Journal of Public Economics, 85(2), p.
149-166.
Gollier C. (2002b), “Time Horizon and the Discount Rate,” Journal of Economic Theory, 107(2),
p. 463-473.
Groom, B., Hepburn C., Koundouri P., Pearce D. (2005), “Discounting the Future: The Long and
the Short of it”, Environmental and Resource Economics, 32(4), p. 445-493.
Howarth R. (1991a), “Intergenerational competitive equilibria under technological uncertainty
and an exhaustible resource constraint,” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management,
21(3), p. 225-243.
Howarth R. (1991b), “Intertemporal equilibria and exhaustible resources: an overlapping genera-
tions approach,” Ecological Economics, 4(3), p. 237-252.
Howarth R., Norgaard R. (1990), “Intergenerational Resource Rights, Eﬃciency, and Social Op-
timality,” Land Economics, 66(1), p. 1-11.
Howarth R., Norgaard R. (1992), “Environmental Valuation under Sustainable Development,”
American Economic Review, 82(2), p. 473-477.
18
Howarth R., Norgaard R. (1993), “Intergenerational transfers and the social discount rate,” En-
vironmental and Resource Economics, 3(4), p. 337-358.
John A., Pecchenino R. (1994), “An Overlapping Generations Model of Growth and the Environ-
ment”, The Economic Journal 104, pp. 1393-1410.
John A., Pecchenino R., Schimmelpfennig D., Schreft S. (1995), “Short-Lived Agents and the
Long-Lived Environment”, Journal of Public Economics 58, 127-141.
Krautkraemer J.K., Batina R.G. (1999), “On Sustainability and Intergenerational Transfers with
a Renewable Resource,” Land Economics, 75(2), p. 167-184.
Kunreuther H., Easterling D. (1990), “Are Risk-Beneﬁt tradeoﬀs possible in siting hazardous
facilities?” American Economic Review Papers and Proc., 80, p. 252-256.
Li C., Lofgren K. (2000), “Renewable Resources and Economic Sustainability: A Dynamic Ana-
lysis with Heterogeneous Time Preferences,” Journal of Environmental Economics and Manage-
ment, 40(3), p. 236-250.
Marini G., Scaramozzinno P. (1995), “Overlapping Generations and Environmental Control”,
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 29, pp. 64-77.
Nordhaus W. (2007), “A Review of the Stern Review on the economics of climate change,” Journal
of Economic Literature, 45(3), p. 686-702.
Pearce D., Groom B., Hepburn C., Koundouri P. (2003), “Valuing the Future: Recent Advances
in Social Discounting,” World Economics, 4(2), p. 121—141.
Portney P.R., Weyant J.P. (1999), Discounting and Intergenerational Equity, Resources for the
Future.
Riddel M., Schwer R.K. (2006), “Winners, Losers, and the Nuclear-Waste Dilemma”, Environ-
mental and Resource Economics (22), pp. 317-338.
Samuelson P.A. (1958), “An Exact Consumption-Loan Model of Interest with or without the
Social Contrivance of Money,” Journal of Political Economy, 66(6), p. 467-482.
Schubert K. (2006), “Discounting and the environment,” Louvain Economic Review, 72(2), p.
157-177.
Shrader-Frechette K. (1994a), “Unsafe at Any Depth: Geological Methods, Subjective Judgments,
and Nuclear Waste Disposal,” Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 54, p. 501-524.
Shrader-Frechette K. (1994b), “Equity and nuclear waste disposal,” Journal of Agricultural and
Environmental Ethics, 7(2), p. 133-156.
Solow R.M. (1974), “The Economics of Resources or the Resources of Economics,” American
Economic Review, 64(2), p. 1-14.
Solow R.M. (1986), “On the Intergenerational Allocation of Natural Resources,” Scandinavian
Journal of Economics, 88(1), p. 141-149.
19
Stern N. (2006), Stern Review on The Economics of Climate Change, HM Treasury, London.
Taebi B. (2012), “Intergenerational Risks of Nuclear Energy,” in Handbook of Risk Theory,
Springer, p. 295-318.
Tsur Y., Zemel A. (1996), “Accounting for global warming risks: resource management under
event uncertainty,” Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 20, p. 1289-1305.
Tsur Y., Zemel A. (1998), “Pollution control in an uncertain environment,” Journal of Economic
Dynamics and Control, 22, p. 967-975.
Tsur Y., Zemel A. (2008), “Regulating environmental threats,” Environmental and Resource Eco-
nomics, 39, p. 297-310.
Valente S. (2011), “Intergenerational externalities, sustainability and welfare - The ambiguous
eﬀect of optimal policies on resource depletion,” Resource and Energy Economics, 33, p. 995-
1014.
von Amsberg J. (1995), “Excessive Environmental Risks: An Intergenerational Market Failure,"
European Economic Review, 39(8), p. 1447-1464.
Weitzman M.L. (1998), “On the welfare signiﬁcance of national product under interest-rate un-
certainty,” European Economic Review, 42(8), p. 1581-1594.
Weitzman M.L. (2007), “A review of the Stern review of the economics of climate change,” Journal
of Economic Literature, 45(3), p. 703-724.
Zhang, J.J. (1999), “Environmental Sustainability, Nonlinear Dynamics and Chaos”, Economic
Theory 14, pp. 489-500.
Appendix
The competitive steady state equilibrium is such that kt+1 = kt = k∗. It is deﬁned by the following
system: 
f ′k = 1 + r
∗
f(k∗)− k∗f ′k = w
∗
(1− τw)w∗ − T y = cy
∗
+ s∗
co
∗
=

1− τk

(1 + r∗) s∗
k∗ = s∗
u′co
u′cy
= 1
(1+r∗)(1−τk)
(1 + r∗) τks∗ + τww∗ + T y = σαφk∗
Q∗ = Q˜h −
φ
h [1− α (1−E (γ˜))] k
∗
(29)
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The planner maximization programme is:
Lt

cyt−1, c
o
t , kt, Qt−1

= (30)
+∞
t=1
δt−1

u

cyt−1, c
o
t

+ θz

Q˜+ [1− h]Qt−1 − (1− α)φkt−1 −E (γ˜)αφkt−i−1;
Q˜+ [1− h]Qt−2 − (1− α)φkt−2 −E (γ˜)αφkt−i−2

−
+∞
t=1
δt−1 λ1,t−1

kt − f (kt−1) + c
y
t−1 + c
o
t−1 + σt−1αφkt−1

−
+∞
t=1
δt−1 λ2,t−1

Qt−1 − Q˜− [1− h]Qt−2 + (1− α)φkt−2 +E (γ˜)αφkt−i−2

The necessary optimal conditions are given by:
∂Lt(.)
∂kt
= 0⇔ λ1 =
Θ(λ2δ+θz′(1+δ))
f ′−σαφ− 1
δ
∂Lt(.)
∂Qt−1
= 0⇔ λ2 =
(1−h)θz′(1+δ)
1−δ(1−h)
∂Lt(.)
∂c
y
t−1
= 0⇔ λ1 = u
′
cy
∂Lt(.)
∂cot
= 0⇔ λ1 =
1
δu
′
co
∂Lt(.)
∂α
= 0⇔ λ1 =
1−E(γ˜)δi
σ
(θz′ (1 + δ) + δλ2)
(31)
21
